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Asymptotes And Metaphors: Teaching Feminist Theory
Michael Eugene Gipson
ABSTRACT

As we move through our daily lives, the cogency of the world shifts and changes.
Many constructs exist to explain and account for how we view and interact with our
environment. Education is where our understandings become formalized and are
challenged. To this end, a plethora of pedagogical tools are made available to aid
educators in illuminating the world(s) around and within each student. However, there is
always room for new ways of presenting information, concepts, and ideas. I put forth the
mathematical trope of asymptotes as a new pedagogical tool. Asymptotes, as metaphor,
work as a pedagogical tool for their utility as both visual and conceptual space. Through
highlighting how asymptotes can map conceptualizations of ‘the body’, be utilized as a
means to build and comprehend theoretical inquiry, and reconceptualize difficult issues
and concepts within Women’s Studies and Feminist classrooms, I posit the asymptotes
metaphor as both visual/conceptual space and pedagogical tool.

iii

Asymptotes and Metaphors

The way(s) that we come to understand and make sense of the world around us is
tied up in relational dynamics (metaphors and binaries). Whether we interrogate, engage,
or disconnect is bound to the different perceptions we have about ‘the world’ and what
we do or do not see based on the interconnections and relationships we have made. This
interrogation, engagement, or disconnection could be seen or defined as an acquired
ability or skill that is gained as we move through and interact with our environment. The
ability to conceptualize, comprehend, and utilize the multiple perceptions and the myriad
of interconnections available, in the world, is important and essential in education and by
extension the classroom. To nurture and incorporate this ability pedagogically, educators
work to shift and expand the perceptive lenses and options of our students, whether we
wish to encourage critical thought, mental and emotional honesty, or the ‘simple’
memorization of information. As educators, the goal and hope is that as the students leave
our course(s), they will have more information, skills, and options than when they
arrived.
In working to this end, we employ a multiplicity of pedagogical tools and skills in
the quest to engage and encourage each individual student. However, there is no singular
magical method that will bring every student to class everyday eager and ready to learn.
Rather, multiple styles of engagement and a plethora of tools are utilized in the hope that
some combination of these will reach the students and connect them and the information,
1

concept(s), or text(s). Jyl Lynn Feldman encourages a reconceptualization of the
classroom from lecture hall to theatrical space (2001); while, bell hooks reformulates it as
the responsible engagement of mutual participants in the Eros of critical thought (1993).
But, whatever conceptualization of the educational dynamic we use, the exchange of
‘knowledge’ remains central.
This exchange of knowledge begins with our basic perceptions and conceptions
about our environment and our selves. However, this is not entirely within our control.
For example, the conceptualizations and understandings we have about our bodies is
mediated via the available frameworks through which bodies can exist and be known. As
such, the constructs and dynamics that surround the epistemological and ontological
“reality” of bodies is important. In “Body as an Asymptote,” I will illuminate the socially
constructed nature of “the body” and how asymptotes work as a metaphor for the
comprehension, engagement, and formulation of this construction. From this
metaphorical relation, I interconnect the function and value of metaphor in theoretical
discussion. In “Metaphor and Theory,” I highlight the metaphorical nature of theoretical
positing. Specifically, I will illuminate the ways that metaphor, my asymptotes metaphor
included, functions as a means to conceptualize, build, and interrogate theoretical
discourse. I will focus on performance theory (specifically Irving Goffman’s
“dramaturgy” and Judith Butler’s “abject bodies”), Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg”, and
Kathy Ferguson’s “Mobile Subjectivities” as exemplars of the diverse formulations and
utilizations of metaphor. Moreover, I will present metaphor as both foundation and tool
for theoretical argumentation. Further, from this explicit positing, I will highlight how
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metaphor works to put forth theoretical discourse and how it aids in the exchange of
knowledge pedagogically.
This pedagogical exchange of knowledge is especially important when engaging
theoretical constructs/concepts and/or facilitating a dialogue in the classroom. In these
cases, there may or may not be a singularly right or wrong answer(s); rather, there is an
interplay of ideas and positions (a)effecting conceptualization and understanding. To
keep this dynamic from digressing into a freewheeling debate, we often employ different
tools and frameworks to encourage the cogency of discussion and the interplay of ideas.
Metaphor and/or metaphorical relations seem to be quite common. Metaphors allow us to
interconnect and interrelate concepts and ideas in a way that encourages more than the
simple acquisition of information. Metaphor opens knowledge, the perceptions of it, and
its building process to engagement and contestation. In short, metaphor is device(s) for
understanding and experiencing one thing in terms of another (Lakoff and Johnson 1980).
Metaphor, then, aids in the basic conception and comprehension of information, keeping
in mind that personal levels of perception can and do impact what is “seen” or not.
Therefore, metaphors and metaphorical interplay can be and have been used and
formulated in a number of different ways. However, of most interest to me, and of
importance in this work, is metaphor as pedagogical tool: specifically, the mathematical
trope of asymptotes and their possible use as metaphor.
I begin by positioning asymptotes as a metaphor parallel to feminist discussions
of the epistemological and ontological constructions of “bodies”. From this positing of
asymptotes as metaphor, I expand to illuminate how metaphors, my own included, make
theoretical positing and argumentation comprehensible. Finally, I explicitly posit the
3

asymptotes metaphor as a pedagogical tool and implicitly present it as a visual and
conceptual critique of Western binary oppositions. To reach this “goal”, we need to begin
by understanding what asymptotes are, what they have to do with the knowing and being
of bodies, and how the mathematical trope of asymptotes can be utilized as metaphor.

4

Body as an Asymptote

What is the definition of “body”? In what way(s) does “body” relate to
individuality? Within feminist theory terms like “body”/ “the body” are quite common
and over time become entrenched in the vocabulary, works, and concepts of many of us.
However, when attempting to impart, share, and engage newcomers, to feminist theory,
we often times have difficulty. It can seem that aiding in the comprehension and
utilization of theoretical concepts/constructs is problematic at best and at least
improbable. So, what do we do to remedy this gulf in understanding and usage?
In my experience, I have found that tangibility is key. The presentation of
something visual, something open to more sensory connections and relationships, greatly
increases the likelihood that students will conceptualize, comprehend, and utilize
theoretical concepts. Like many of my students, when I began reading and working with
theoretical concepts, I had an extremely difficult time understanding and connecting
theoretical terms, concepts, and constructions leaving comprehension, legibility, and
intelligibility seemingly impossible. But, what I needed, and eventually found, was a
tangible piece, a visual something, that I could perceive, manipulate, and engage. I found
asymptotes. Asymptotes, like many theoretical concepts, are intangible; however, the
rules for their existence, the space(s) they inhabit, the topography available for
movement, and even the ways to “see” these invisible intangibles are all defined. In the
end, it requires using what is seen to see the unseen. To this end, I started with the seen
5

and began my search. What follows is the theoretical and linguistic journey of the
asymptote. I begin with something considered quite tangible “the body”. From this space
of physicality, I will enter the less concrete and more fluid theoretical realm. Through this
movement, I will highlight the capabilities of asymptotes to work as metaphor. I do this
to show that this tangible intangible can be utilized as a means of visualizing (making
tangible) other theoretical concepts for comprehension and educational purposes. To
begin, I will map and connect asymptotes and bodies.
The ‘body’ is represented and discussed in numerous ways within social, political,
and medical contexts. It is described as a mirror, a corporeal form with a fictive
interiority, a social canvas, and so on. These constructions are reified, critiqued, and
shifted. Furthermore, many theorists note how the dichotomous and hierarchied systems
available for the discussions of the body are restrictive and problematic (and destructive).
Within this section, I will discuss some of the ways through which the understandings
and conventions, related to the body, have been produced. Through the examination of
these terrains of the body, I will illuminate the framework for an alternative mode of
body knowledge—asymptote as a metaphor for the conceptualization(s) of the body. This
conceptualization of the body is in response to the vast field of critical lenses available
for viewing bodies. To aid in fleshing out the conceptualization(s) of ‘the body’ via
asymptote, I will highlight some of the parallels between the construction and
presentation(s)of both. Additionally, through the discussion of the connections between
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asymptotes and bodies, I intend to erect three different constructions of the body as an
asymptote: abject body1, enframing the body, and telos body.
What are asymptotes and how can they be used to discuss bodies? The asymptote2
functions in such a fashion that there are points (bodies) that matter, a la Judith Butler,
and those that do not matter (abjects). Additionally, this mathematical trope illuminates a
key point within many theorists’ works—specifically, that the telos3 or ideal body, or the
construction of it, is not attainable by any body. Moreover, the teleological body
functions in a fashion similar to that of the asymptote(s) that some curving functions
approach but never touch (attain)4. A brief discussion of the relation between the graphic
space in which asymptotes exist and the socio-medical-political domain(s) of bodies will
aid in revealing the terrains I wish to traverse and link.
Bodies and asymptotes are accorded their definitions, shapes, names, and spaces
based on the fields they inhabit. Asymptotes exist within the frame of a graph and,
relatedly, bodies exist within a given socio-historical temporality. The graph and sociohistorical temporality both function to enframe what can and cannot be, i.e. what is
legible and what is intelligible (Brown 2001, Butler 1993, Foucault 1980). Specifically,
these two frames define the terrain in which bodies/asymptotes exist. For asymptotes, the
graph defines where, how, and in which way(s) it may exist—be named—via the specific

1

These multiple constructions are built purposefully and in a fashion similar to Judith Butler’s dual
construction of abject in Butler, Judith (1998). “How Bodies Come to Matter: An Interview with Judith
Butler” by Irene Costera Meijer and Baukje Prins in Signs Vol. 23, No. 2 Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press. 275-286.
2
Asymptote: (noun) Mathematics a straight line approached by a given curve as one of the variables in the
equation of the curve approaches infinity. Webster’s College Dictionary, 1991 edition.
3
My understanding of this is loosely informed by Aristotle’s construction. For more information see
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Terence Irwin. 2nd ed. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1999. 325.
4
I would like to thank Carolyn Di Palma and Jennifer Germaine for their aid in helping to clarify my
understandings of attainability.
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equation that sets the rules/parameters for its shaping. The location of the curves in the
figure below and those to follow are based on the mathematical principles of positive and
negative. Figure 1 (below) contains a visual representation of this concept, wherein the
grid of horizontal and vertical lines designate the terrain/domain in which the graphic
presentation of a mathematical equation may exist (enter intelligibility).5 For example, if
the equation was Y = 1/ -X, then the curves would be in the empty quadrants and where
the curves are now would be empty.6 Similarly,
the dynamics that are present within the sociohistorical temporality define how, which, and
what can be or are thought about bodies.
Moreover, these dynamics, whether social,
political, medical, or otherwise, affect the
physical and epistemological terrains of
bodies.
In Sexing the Body: Gender Politics
and the Construction of Sexuality, Anne Fausto-Sterling examines the ways that bodies
are defined through and within social, political, and medical contexts (2000). She
5

Within the grid, the central vertical line is designated the y-axis and the central horizontal line the x-axis.
The curves contained within the graph (now called a graph due to the inclusion of axis and increments) are
representative of the following equation: y=1/x. To alleviate confusion, it should be remembered that the
horizontal and vertical lines happen to occupy the same exact space the asymptotes for y=1/x do.
However, while the x- and y-axes are visible, the asymptotes are invisible. This is due asymptotes lines
being both locations of infinitude and undefinable—i.e. in the equation zero cannot ever be x, as zeroes
cannot be denominators. Therefore, in this figure, as well as those to follow, the visual lines represent a
dual conception: visible grid lines and invisible asymptotes. Thus, there is a continual slippery connection
between the seen and unseen, not a designation of the asymptotes always having the exact same
formulation in each positing.
6
Through the rest of this work, only the original two curves will be presented. This is done for two reasons:
legibility (as words and concepts will be added later) and simplicity (as the figures can become too busy/
messy when several curves and words are present).
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illuminates the terrain/grid of the body(s) and how the conceptualizations of this terrain
affect physical bodies—i.e. how the discourses in socio-medical politics affect the
constructions (discursive) of and about the corporeality of bodies. Specifically, she
examines the rules and systems that these discourses implement in relation to bodies.
Socio-medical-political discourses, and more explicitly the methods used, are critiqued
for their ability and violence in affecting the corporeality of the ‘body’. She posits that
the rhetoric and practices used to designate ‘bodies’ affect not only the physical body
(e.g. intersexed bodies) but also the discourse(s) and modes of thought available for
making ‘bodies’ intelligible. The designation of bodies “allowed” and/or knowable
within socio-medical-political domain(s) relates to my former discussion of the visibility
available for mathematical equations through the interactions between the rhetorical and
physical (re)presentations of different functions.7 Fausto-Sterling writes: “[p]eople of
mixed sex [intersexed bodies] all but disappeared, not because they had become rarer, but
because scientific methods [socio-medical politics] classified them out of existence”
(2000, 39). In reference to Figure 1, this statement can be represented in the interaction
between the asymptotes and the hyperbolic curve. The asymptotes would represent
intersexed bodies that lay outside of intelligibility—outside of known socio-medicalpolitical intelligibility, which would be represented by the hyperbolic curve. My point is
that this visual representation of ‘bodies’ outside intelligibility highlights one of my
7

The point of importance to note here is that the location and number of asymptotes within the graph of a
function are defined by a specific equation, which can and does shift. The basic formula for a hyperbolic
function (which has asymptotes) is ax^2 + by^2 + cxy + dx + ey + f = 0 [a, b, c, d, e, and f can be any
integer and thus greatly effect the shaping of the graph]. “Hyperbola, n. Geom., a plane curve consisting of
two separate, equal and similar, infinite branches, formed by the intersection of a plane with both branches
of a double cone (i.e. two similar cones on opposite sides of the same vertex).” Oxford English Dictionary
Online, Oxford University Press, 2003. “Hyperbolic, adj. 1. Rhet. Extravagant, 2. Geom. A: Of, belonging
to, or of the form or nature of a hyperbola. B: Applied to functions, operations, etc., having some relation to
the hyperbola.” Oxford English Dictionary Online, Oxford University Press, 2003.
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specific constructions of body as an asymptote, asymptotes as abject bodies. However,
this dynamic of knowable and abject is not the only asymptotic8 construction possible.
When thinking of ‘bodies’, the concepts, names, definitions, and systems related
to them are not as mutually exclusive as they initially appear to be. Bodies are influenced
within present contexts—yes, but contexts are connected to the socio-historical moments
from which they emerged9. For example, for people of the twentieth-century the two-sex
model10 for defining bodies seems “natural”. However, this only appears to be the case
due to a few hundred years of social and political discourse affecting the ways through
and in which bodies are thought. Prior to the emergence (in a Foucauldian sense) of the
two-sex model, however, a one-sex model for bodies was normative.11 What is of interest
in this shift, for my project, is how these two models framed the epistemological terrains
for the discourses on bodies (Laqueur 1990). Explicitly, these models mapped the terrains
for the discussions of bodies and more importantly defined the ways through which
discussions of bodies could exist. These two points are very intriguing for their parallel
position to the ways in which the specific equation of a hyperbola defines its existence—
i.e. how the equation(s) of a hyperbola and the related asymptotes frame the space
possible for the hyperbolic curve (see footnote 6). Laqueur notes how when the one-sex
model was prominent the construction of body was based on a uniform and singular

8

Asymptotic: (adj.) Mathematics 1. of or pertaining to an asymptote. 2. (of a function) approaching a given
value as an expression containing a variable tends to infinity. 3. coming into consideration as a variable
approaches a limit, usu. infinity. Also, I use this term in a similar fashion to Michel Foucault’s in History of
Sexuality: An Introduction, Vol. 1. Vintage Books, Random House, Inc.: New York, 1978, 41.
9
For an in-depth discussion of emergence see Michel Foucault “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” The
Foucault Reader. Edited Paul Rabinow. New York: Pantheon. 1984, 109- 133.
10
Laqueur makes this argument in Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1990.
11
The telos position of male within the one-sex model and its shift to dominant and ideal within the twosex model will be discussed later.
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ideal—the adult, citizen male. He points out that as the two-sex model gained
prominence, the modality of bodies shifted to include a dual construction for bodies.
Moreover, Laqueur illustrates how this modal shift affected the rhetoric and physicality
of bodies. Specifically, this shift was a splitting of the telos body into two interdependent
bodies. This interdependence is due to the conceptual mode, normative social dynamics,
that posited the male body (formerly at the top of the telos) as positive and the female
body as negative—explicitly a negated body in so much as this body was ‘lacking’ and
therefore less than.
In relation to the hyperbolic curve and its asymptotes, the curves in Figure 1 could
be said to represent the one-sex model in the sense that this curve has not been shifted—
specifically this hyperbola’s asymptotes are on the x- and y- axes. But, this same figure
could be said to represent the two-sex model, as well, for the two curves contained
therein are exact copies of each other. The reason that these curves can be representative
of the two-sex model is through the functioning of attributes—in this case numbers.
When positive numbers (attributes) are used (defined) the curve is contained within the
upper right corner of the graph, this space contains only positive x and y values.12
However, if negative numbers (attributes) are used (defined) the curve is contained
within the lower right corner which contains only negative x and y values. This
conceptualization of Laqueur’s argument and Figure 1 is important because of the
specific designation of spaces (epistemologies) I am attempting to make. Explicitly,
within Laqueur’s work, he is illustrating how the designations, inclusions, and exclusions
12

This positive/ negative relation is important because of the hierarchical nature of binaries. This
power/value differential is “always” at play, implicitly and explicitly. However, the progression through the
figures to come should not be conceptualized as being based solely on this differential. Rather, they should
be viewed in relation to the explicit discussions tied to each and the way(s) that these are grouped together.
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within the one- and two-sex models acted as frames through which the discourses,
conceptualizations, and corporealities of bodies came to and could exist. Similarly, in
Figure 1, the asymptotes (x and y axes) frame the space available for the curves. To
expand this idea of frames and their affects on bodies, Geoffrey Bowker and Susan L.
Star’s discussions of tuberculosis in “Of Tuberculosis and Trajectories” and racial
classifications in “The Case of Race Classifications and Reclassification under
Apartheid” are very useful.
Through the analyses of classificatory systems and their affects, Bowker and Star
illustrate the ways these systems frame identity and the subject body. When analyzing the
affects of tuberculin diagnosis, they note that once a person became a patient with
tuberculosis, the ways available to describe, relate, identify, and so on the person became
framed within the context of the tuberculosis diagnosis. It was extremely difficult, if not
impossible, to step outside of or remove the frame of disease. To be exact, when the
person was a patient they were defined by their diagnosis. Moreover, even after they left
the hospital (if they survived) the person was related to as having had tuberculosis—i.e.
once a person was framed by the diagnosis that frame ‘forever’ altered the means
available for viewing/knowing them as an individual (2000). However, this distinctive
shift in subjection has quite a different affect when Bowker and Star’s theoretical lens
centers on race instead of disease. In “The Case of Race Classification and
Reclassification under Apartheid”, they illuminate the shifting and blurring that occurred
when the conceptions of subject, body, and race intersected. Specifically, they noted how
the production and implementation of more discrete and fortified racial classifications
made it possible for one’s identity to become completely shifted by not only the
12

system/state but by one’s self13 (2000). These permeable and shiftable classifications are
important in relation to the forming of bodies. Pointedly, the mobility and porous
designations of subject and body illustrate how frames, whether medical, political, or
social, only appear ‘natural’ due to their general status of invisibility. Moreover, it is this
hidden frame that allows for the appearance of ‘natural-ness’—which designates legible
and intelligible bodies. Formerly, I noted how asymptotes and socio-medical-political
discourses define and contain the epistemologies and ontologies of the body, which
appeared to be discrete and immutable. However, in this section I have attempted to show
how these constructs can be reinterpreted. Specifically, though bodies can be
epistemically and ontologically defined by race, disease, socio-medical-political, and so
on, discourses—like hyperbolas by asymptotes—these frames that signify bodies are not
immobile and static: rather, they can and do shift and change. Thus, consistent with
Foucault, I argue that enframing the body and the subject is not a singular event or
emergence; rather, it is an affective process. Further, this enframing the body is the
second asymptote-body construction I wished to posit. However, the affective process on
and mobility of the subject-body is the third body as asymptote construct I feel needs to
be illuminated further to connect this metaphor and conceptualizations of the body.
What designates an acceptable, and more importantly attainable, body is defined
by the specific socio-historical temporality in which the question is posed. As noted
formerly, Laqueur’s work Making Sex is an intensive critical analysis of the shift from
what he calls a one-sex to two-sex model. Within the one-sex model, the position of male

13

For a specific example see the case of Jazz musician Vic Wilkinson on page 205 of Bowker and Star’s
“The Case of Race Classification and Reclassification under Apartheid”. Sorting Things Out: Classification
and its Consequences (Inside Technology).
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at the top of the telos14 is what I wish to focus on momentarily for it may allow the
answering of several questions. How is it the construction of telos is built on the
assumption that the top is attainable when so few are ever actually at the top, if at all? In
what ways is this seemingly unattainable top of the telos related to the position of one
construction of abject as outside the discursive frame? If telos is in actuality an
unattainable position and instead functions as a site of convergence, then how could this
telos be seen as an ever-shifting goal? In what ways are the power dynamics embedded in
the telos of equal, and in some cases more, importance than the telos itself? Though it
appears that these are a vast range of questions, I believe that these questions can be at
least tied together through the affective process in the shift from a one-sex to two-sex
model.
A key point within the one-sex model construct is that the male position/body at
the top of the telos is attainable. However, when we look back at recorded history some
interesting questions arise. One, if this position is attainable (supposedly) by anyone
(male) then why would concerns about race and class become so problematic as we
progress (temporally) forward toward the present day? And, two, when the male at the
top of the telos shifted to dominant within the two-sex model, what was the impact on the
relationship between men and women and within these “new” categorizations? These two
questions are interrelated through power. Michel Foucault noted that power is pervasive,
active, and inescapable (1990, 1995). The male position at the top of the telos in the onesex model requires the use and consolidation of power. Those few males (white, citizen,
14

This positioning of the male teleological body and the “attainability” of telos is discussed in a similar
style to that of the gender pyramids of Kate Bornstein in My Gender Workbook: How to Become the Kind
of Man or Woman You Always Thought You Could Be…or Something Else Entirely (1998) New York, NY:
Routledge.
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elite, etc.) who it could be argued existed, as the ‘embodiment’ of the top of the telos,
would have had to embody the ideological constructions of what male-ness or
masculinity was at the time. Thus, temporality would have and has had a great influence
on the construction of what traits and/or characteristics would designate the top of the
telos. Further, as we progress (temporally) through history, the constructions and
dynamics interacting on the telos would change and shift. Furthermore, as the shift from
the different constructions of telos occurred, and eventually the shift to the two-sex
model, we could upon inspection possibly recognize the mutability of borders that would
have allowed previous abjects to enter intelligibility. Moreover, as these new intelligibles
entered discourse the constructions of what was normative and/or ideal would have
shifted, eventually, affecting the interpolations of the telos.
To reconnect this concept to Foucault’s positing, the will to power would have
been greatly influential in these shifts in the telos because as individuals enter
intelligibility they could be said to gain a degree of power that their formerly abject
position did not possess. These shifts in power are important for they highlight an
important point. The un-attainability of the top of the telos has everything to do with the
ideological constructions of the body in that position. Specifically, this position, I believe,
can never actually contain a corporeal body instead an ideological construct of one. What
does this mean for the shift from the one-sex model with male at the top of the telos to
the two-sex model where male is dominant? Pointedly, that there is not a corporeal body
that in actuality matches the ideologically constructed one; instead, there are always and

15

only approximations of that ideal15. And, what of the telos and the asymptote? What is
the connection? The telos of bodies, which contains the epistemic and ontologic
constructions, is still functional within the two-sex model because it designates the
“ideal” forms that bodies should or can take. And, the telos relates to (is related through)
the conjunction of abject bodies, enframed bodies, and the affective process of
approximation—which due to socio-historical temporalities will shift and change.
Perhaps, some more tangible example of my meaning and constructions will aid in
highlighting the connections I wish to make.
The influence of the supposed ‘attainable telos’ can be seen today within a
number of realms. Dan Edelman’s The Thin Red Line: Social Power and The Open Body
illustrates the ways that the ideological constructions of the body influence the
corporeality of them. In his discussion of “Bodybuilding/Shaping”, Edelman points out
how the will to power, internalized identification with the ‘ideal’, abject epistemologies,
and personal frame of reference all influence the corporeality of bodies. Specifically, he
notes that bodybuilding requires the controlling of the body (will to power) to alter it
progressively towards a specific goal (internalized ideal, social norm). Further, he notes
how the individual’s understanding (frame) of their body influences their acceptance or
denial (abjection) of some bodies and/or personal body topography (2000). In his
discussion of “Cosmetic Surgery”, Edelman expands the idea of “the body is the
inscribed surface of events” (Foucault, 1984) to “the literal and explicit enactment of this
process of inscription” (2000, abstract). Edelman illustrates how the process of cosmetic
surgery is a convergence of several ideologies: the will to power—over the body,
15

This concept is informed by Judith Butler’s construction of performativity in Bodies That Matter: On the
Discursive Limits of Sex. New York: Routledge, 1993.
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internalization of ‘ideal’—thus, the need for cosmetic surgery, abjection—denial of some
types of embodiment as acceptable, and the socio-normative frame of beauty.
In both of these discussions, Edelman highlights what I call an affective process
of approximation. Within these discussions, bodies are affected by internalized ideals, the
need/desire to match or approximate the ideals, abjection in the sense that the body is a
terrain to be adjusted, cut, reshaped, or reinterpreted, and framed by social norms and
ideals that designate acceptable and unacceptable bodies. Furthermore, the ideological
body that is being approximated, the top of the telos, is never actually achieved. Thus, as
individual bodies approximate the top of the telos they could be seen as acting similarly
to the way that the hyperbola continually approaches an asymptote but never achieves it.
Moreover, since both the hyperbola and bodies could be said to approach infinitude—
hyperbolas can have an infinite number of integers and never touch the asymptote
(remembering that in the figure the axes and the asymptotes occupy the same space and
are never touched by the curves, only approached), and the ideological body at the top of
the telos (telos body) will continually shift due to the changing socio-historical
temporality within which it is defined—then the asymptote and the telos could be said to
be the infinite that the hyperbola and bodies attempt to reach but never attain.
Through the connections of bodies and asymptotes, I have attempted to illuminate
a terrain from which to attain an understanding of the epistemologies and ontologies of
the body. I positioned the mathematical trope of asymptotes as a metaphor for
conceptualizing the ways that bodies are thought about, presented, and “allowed” to be.
From the topographic terrain of bodies and mathematical trope of asymptotes, I wish to
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extend this conceptualization of metaphor and engage the interactions of metaphor and
theory or theoretical discourse.

18

Theory and Metaphor

In discussions of theory and metaphor, it is important to clarify and note some
specific conceptual and terminological definitions and connections. First, if I am talking
or writing about a theory or theoretical idea, model, construct, and so on, then I need to
be cognizant that theories encapsulate and designate a specific set of dynamics and/or
relationships that are dependent on an order/system of understanding, meaning, and
“value”, be it multi-variant/ multidimensional or linear. These dynamics, relationships,
orders, and systems generally rely on a singular focus/ intent and understanding. From
within this space or dynamic, my second point emerges. Representations, and the
meanings and values attached to them, are often intentionally or unintentionally
metaphorical in nature. In Metaphors We Live By, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson note
we often experience and understand things in terms of others, which allows us to transfer/
borrow meaning(s) from other realms of interpretation [perception?] (1980). For
example, if I wish to study or understand “contemplation” I could approach it from
several angles. As a behavioral psychologist, I could catalog and conceptualize a series or
sequence of behaviors that are “intrinsic” to contemplation. As a sociologist, I could
focus on how the “contemplation” affects the socio-personal relationships between
individuals and/or designated groups. As there are a considerable number of available
theoretical frameworks, tests, methods, and systems to “look at” contemplation, a
multitude of understandings, definitions, and arguments could be made; but, at the base
19

of all these lies a system of relation that interconnects object, subject, meaning and value.
This is where metaphor lives.16 Metaphor weaves physicality, concept, and value together
in contingent understandings. Metaphor, then, is a means to comprehend, engage and/or
formulate an understanding of something through the re-presentation of connections and
meanings. And, this is where metaphor can aid in theoretical discussion, in
comprehension, and conceptualization. Through this chapter, I will show how my
metaphor of the asymptote works to not only undergird theory, but how it can aid in
argumentation and comprehension. I begin with a look at performance theory—explicitly
Irving Goffman’s “dramaturgy” and Judith Butler’s “abject bodies” where metaphor or
representation works to conceptualize, argue, and define theoretical constructs while
mapping shifts in meaning and to conceptualize the shifting interactive domain of the
social world. Next, I focus on D. Haraway’s “Cyborg” to highlight how metaphors and
the asymptote are not simple re-presentations; rather, they are centers or nexuses of
meaning where multiple (often contentious) conceptualizations and perceptions can meet
in a relational paradigm. Finally, I highlight Kathy Ferguson’s “Mobile Subjectivities” as
a means to conceptualize metaphors and asymptotes as mutable, multiplicitious
16

The study of this falls under the broad rubric of semiotics—the study of signs. A brief discussion of
semiotics will be dealt with in “Metaphor as Pedagogical Tool”; however, for a good starting point and
background on semiotics see the following works: Browning, F. 1994. The Culture of Desire: Paradox and
Perversity in Bay Lives Today. New York, NY: Bay Press—a discussion of the impacts and
interconnections of naming, iconography, and identity. Butler, J. 1993. Bodies That Matter: On the
Discursive Limits of “Sex”. New York, NY: Routledge—a discussion of the interactions and affects of
language, identity, agency, and socio-political applicability. Dyer, R. 1977. “Stereotyping” in The
Columbia Reader on Lesbian and Gay Men in Media, Society, and Politics. Edited by Gross, L. and
Woods, J. D. New York, NY: Columbia University Press—an examination of language, identity, and social
dynamics. Foucault, M. 1980. “Two Lectures” in Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other
Writings 1972-1977. Edited and Translated by Colin Gordon. New York, NY: Pantheon. 78-109—a
discussion of the interplay between language, knowledge, and society. Irigaray, L. 1985. This Sex Which Is
Not One. Translated by Gillian C. Gill. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press—an examination of language
as it relates to legibility, intelligibility, and socio-political dynamics. This is by no means an exhaustive
list, these works inform this work however contain discussions that are beyond the scope of it.
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conceptions for the comprehension, engagement, and discussion of social constructs,
while acknowledging the need for situational solidity and fixity. In the discussions to
follow, it must be understood that I approach these works from the position that metaphor
(with all its semiotic twists and turns) forms the grounding framework for perception and
communication17. As such, I have conceptualized the theorists’ positings as metaphorical
in nature; although, the theorists themselves may or may not agree with this
conceptualization.
“All the world’s a stage,
And all the men and women merely players:
They have their exits and their entrances.” 18
This statement illuminates several of the dynamics at play in performance theory.
Here, I outline first Goffman’s notion of “dramaturgy” because he explicitly utilizes the
performance metaphor. I, then, shift to a discussion of Butler’s “abject bodies” (Butler
1993, Goffman 1959). Performance involves a set of designated statements, behaviors,
and socially staged intentions. The performance of these occurs within a space—the
social—and in line with the statement above, occurs everywhere. And, this performance
is bound by rules of conduct, expectation and execution (Goffman 1959). To start,
imagine sitting in a theater.19 On “stage”, a scene (location) is set, an actor enters, and the
show begins. In this space, there are several assumptions the actor(s) and audience agree
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See Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980) for the
positing of how this conceptualization of metaphor as foundational dynamic works and its (probable)
implications.
18
Shakespeare, W. (1936) “As You Like It”, in The Complete Works of William Shakespeare: The
Cambridge Edition Text edited by William A. Wright. Garden City, New York: Garden City Publishing
Co., Inc. Act II, vii, 40-43.
19
I am starting with a framework more inline with Goffman to build the conceptual space for Butler’s
positing.
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upon. For the actor(s), (1) the presentation or act occurs within the confines of the stage
(generally), (2) the location, time, date and so on are put forth as “the world” that the
actor’s character inhabits, (3) the events, behaviors, conversations, etc. may (not) extend
past the stage20, (4) the character presented may (not) put forth the individual actor’s
person/self, (5) the “reality” of the world on stage exists only as long as the actor(s) and
the audience continue to accept it as such. For the audience, (1) “reality’s” rules of
behavior, language, physics and so on are in suspension for the duration of the
play/scene, (2) the existence of the “audience”
may (not) be included in the play/scene21, (3)
the events, behaviors, comments, etc. occur in
“the world” set forth not ‘reality’, and (4) the
agreement that the play/scene may include or
exclude the audience based on “rules” set by
the script. With these points in mind,
Goffman’s “dramaturgy” requires only the
expansion of the concept from the confines of
the theatre to the social world or everyday “reality”. This seemingly difficult shift, in
essence, is quite simple. The differences between Figure 2: The Theatre (above) and
Figure 3: The Social World (below) are rather obvious but an explanation will prove
helpful.
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This will depend on whether the scene/play uses what is termed open or closed sets, specifically, is the
edge of the stage an open space or a closed space/wall.
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Comments, behaviors, or responses that include the audience in the play’s process, plot, events, and so
on. These are distinct from the “breaking of character” where the actor becomes her/himself that is not part
of the play/scene.
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In the first defining of performance, the space/location and rules were designated
as theater based (See Figure 2: The Theatre, above). In this conception, the actor(s) and
audience were given specific domains and “rules”. The actor occupies the stage and the
audience watches the “show”. Similar to Figure 1: Y = 1 / X (pg 3), Figure 2: The
Theatre contains all of the concomitant pieces for asymptotes. However, here, rather than
bodies, per se, being the focus, a set of relations is posited: Actor-stage, actor-audience,
audience seating, and actor/audience-theater. The edge of the stage and audience seating
are both explicitly delineated by the curves. The theatre is the overall available space.
And, the asymptotes (x- and y-axes) are the tacit agreements of actor(s) and audience. In
the most general sense, this is the “dynamic”
of the theatre. However, Goffman’s
“dramaturgy,” though similar in dynamic, is
actually a metaphorical extension of theatrical
space into the social world.
Goffman’s “dramaturgy” occurs (takes
place) in the social world, a world bound by
power/discourse, inclusions/exclusions, and
legibility/intelligibility. In Figure 3: Social
World/Spatial (right), the same lines and curves are shown, however some labels and
dynamics are different. The actor is now an individual and the audience is a collection of
other individuals in the social world. The dynamics have shifted from the “rules of the
theatre” to the social “norms” for language, behavior, value, etc. But, where Figure 2:
The Theatre presents a model of tacit agreement, Figure 3: The Social World/Spatial re23

presents this as an implicit and explicit set of relationships. The individual (unlike the
actor) does not have an exact script to follow; instead, he/she has a fluid system of rules
of conduct/behavior, language, identification, and so on. Goffman posits that several
simultaneous dynamics are active in the social world. One, an individual in the social
world is and can only be designated as such for as long as he/she remains legible and
intelligible within it. Two, the social world is built through a reiterative set of inclusions
and exclusions which simultaneously mark “what will and will not be the stuff of the
object to which we then refer” (Butler, 1993)—i.e. what is part of the social world is
known through not only what is included but what is excluded as well. Three, the
reiterative process, in the social world, is power for it both persists and enforces the
“norm” while at the same time opens the “norm” to disruption and contestation. And,
four, the individual is the actor and the audience, in social space, because the social
encapsulates both the conception of the individual and the connective dynamic(s)
between the individual, other individuals, and the social world. By extension, the
conception of the individual exists both as an internal matrix and as an external space
(Butler, 1993). To concentrate on how Goffman’s performance metaphor may inform
gender analysis, a reconceptualization of the social world is necessary to shift from
Goffman’s construct of “dramaturgy” to Butler’s “abject bodies.”
The reconceptualization of the social world requires, not the eclipsing of the
physical person by presentation or performance, rather, a change in perspective.
Specifically, there are three areas that need to be highlighted, which I designate as:
inclusion/exclusion, power/discourse, and legibility/intelligibility. As the individual is
both in and of the social world, the “norms” (be they behavioral, linguistic, emotive, etc)
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are at the same time internal and external to the individual. Thus, the conceptualization
and value of these becomes central, due to the impact that discourse and “power” have on
the individual and the social world. Therefore, the construction of “Figure 3: The Social
World-Spatial” does not present a fully comprehensible positing of Butler’s
“performativity”(as it does for Goffman’s “dramaturgy”), rather “Figure 4: The Social
World-Conceptual” is more functional. In
Figure 4 (right), the curves represent the
extremity of the positively/negatively valued
“norms” within the social. Specifically, these
curves denote the limit of what is legible and
intelligible in social space. For example, an
individual could identify him/herself as a
student, sibling, worker, thief, or murderer and
so on because these have an identifiable value
and meaning; however this same individual could not identify as banana, hat, sword, etc.
in social space. This is due to the conceptualization of what “individual” means and the
terms and concepts available.22 Therefore, the space outside of the curves denotes and
forms the discursive limit for legibility and intelligibility. To be precise, it works as an
unchartable region of abjects, a region of abjection23, which is only understandable as
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I am cognizant of Judith Butler’s argumentation about agency, however I am not including here due to
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“Imitation and Gender Insubordination” in The Second Wave: A Reader in Feminist Theory, edited by
Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 300-315).
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Abject/Abjection though related to Butler’s “performativity” is not dealt with here because (1) this
discussion is vast and a work in and of itself and (2) it will be discussed in the next chapter as an example
of some complex and theoretically difficult topics in teaching feminist theory and how the asymptote
metaphor works for pedagogical purposes.
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that which is beyond social cogency. This asymptotical relation is important because,
whether we focus on Figure 2, 3, or 4, the performativity/ performance metaphor (like the
asymptote) opens social space and conceptualization to theoretical inquiry and
engagement. However, this multiplicitious ability of metaphor (and asymptote) is not its
only function or value. Metaphor can also act as a nexus or center point for a variety of
theoretical and conceptual ideas, dynamics and systems.
Metaphors allow for the mapping of shifts or changes in meaning and/or value.
They, also, serve as centers for the illumination of conceptual/theoretical interconnection
and nexuses for multiple dynamics and systems of meaning. Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg”
works to highlight how oppositional constructions and systems of thought are actually
interdependent conceptualizations built of exclusion and elision. “Cyborg” accomplishes
this through its function as metaphor and nexus. This metaphorical action offers a
different conceptualization of self, sociality, and meaning attribution. Haraway’s
“Cyborg” is constructed with several ideas and dynamics interconnected: (1) cyborgs are
hybrid beings, (2) these hybrids are built of multiple systems of meaning and value, and
(3) the hybridization that is the ‘cyborg’ opens the way for us to move beyond the
dualisms in Western tradition. (Haraway, 1985) But, to more fully explain this metaphor
as nexus/center, a more specific and cohesive delving into Haraway’s concept is
essential, for the “Cyborg” exists between—i.e. it is a third space in a world of pairs.
Haraway’s “cyborg” exists between and at the boundaries of science fiction (the
imaginary or conceptual) and social reality (the real or physical)—where these fade or
meld into each other (1985). It is here that the distinctions between them present as an
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“optical illusion(s)” (1985).24 This fading/melding/between space(s) is where the cyborg
metaphor opens dualities to interrogation and engagement. Haraway points out three
major components of social reality (understanding these as gendered): human/ animal,
natural (organic)/man-made (machine), and physical/non-physical25 (1985). These
formulations construct a series of bounded distinctions present within the personal,
social, and medical/scientific world. This splitting of “the world”, through these forms,
builds and encourages a perception that is hierarchical and absolute in nature. Figure 5:
Binaries (right) show how this splitting
confines perceptions and conceptions: human
distinct from animal, organic from man-made
and so on. However, the “cyborg” is posited to
breaking these distinctions. Specifically,
because “[t]he cyborg is resolutely committed
to partiality, irony, intimacy, and perversity”,
there must be a “programmatic rejection of the
heroic human myths of Origin and End”
(Haraway, 1985)—meaning that as the distinctions between blur the traditional
conceptions of identity become untenable. So, if the boundaries between human and
animal, natural and man-made, etc. are fading and/or melding, then the standard
constructions and understandings must be changed. Thus, the “cyborg” as a “kind of
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space of the invisible asymptotes.
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Haraway does not see these as distinctly separate, however she does acknowledge these as being
perceived this way.
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disassembled and reassembled, postmodern collective and personal self” sits in the nexus
of several conceptual and perceptual dynamics. (Haraway, 1985)
The “cyborgs” occupation of multi-layered dynamics allows for the asymptotic
bridging of conceptual frameworks and meanings. Haraway’s conception of “cyborg”
maps the seemingly disjointed chain of perceptual illusions and simultaneously offers a
way out. Haraway highlights the need to give up or move past dualistic, mutually
exclusive patterns of conceptualization and organization. Instead of looking for
disconnection, explicit differentiation, and/or concrete proof, we should be looking
toward and striving for “recognition of connection”, the “ambiguity of differences”, and
“signals”/signs. (Haraway, 1985) Haraway
offers some rather compelling examples to
illuminate problems in dualistic thinking’s
exclusionary dynamics and how this process
elides the relationship between the parts of the
binary. By separating human from animal,
human-animal from machine, and the physical
from the non-physical, Haraway posits that we
have limited our ability to conceptualize,
comprehend, and change or escape destructive ways of thinking and even being. The
cyborg metaphor works as a bridge to do this because it attempts to find a “common
language in which all resistance to instrumental [social] control disappears and all
heterogeneity can be submitted to disassembly, reassembly, investment, and exchange”.
(Haraway, 1985) But, rather than be caught in another set of binaries, the cyborg
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metaphor follows an asymptotic path. The cyborg occupies no distinct position or
location, rather it functions as a nexus for different discursive communities, bringing
these together in conversation while incorporating, informing, and recontextualizing
each. In Figure 6: Cyborgs (above), a few examples of what ‘cyborg’ incorporates, as
nexus, are shown as lying between the curves. These curves, as noted for Figure 5:
Binaries, are the policed boundaries that the “social world” see as necessary. The
“Cyborg” sits in a position similar to that of asymptotes. And, like asymptotes, instead of
explicitly leaving or falling into the binaries, Haraway’s “cyborg” functions between, at
the edges of, and bridges these offering a new way to conceptualize, understand, and be.
The “cyborg” shows how metaphor can function, not just as a map of shifts or simple
replacement of concept for concept, but as a nexus or central point for relationships in
meaning, value, and understanding. In contrast, Kathy Ferguson’s “Mobile
Subjectivities” illuminates how metaphors are not only representations or
interconnections rather they can also be multi-conceptual, multi-definitional constructs
for formulating and weaving fluidic and amorphous theoretical models.
Kathy Ferguson’s “Mobile Subjectivities” illuminates the contentious utility of
metaphor to conceptualize. Mobile Subjectivities, though theoretically tied to
identification and/or selfhood, highlight how metaphors can function in multiplicity
without losing cohesion. Ferguson’s metaphor is not simply a new representation or a
system of connections; it is “too concrete and dirty to claim innocence too much inprocess to claim closure, too interdependent to claim fixed boundaries. Unstable but
potent, diverse but not incomprehensible…mobile subjectivities [can] play across
terrains…refusing stable memberships while insisting on affiliations.” (Ferguson, 1993)
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The use of metaphor, by Ferguson, encourages theoretical constructs to be about more
than epistemology, ontology, or both; her metaphor puts forth a conception of theory that
exceeds physical, linguistic, and emotive paradigms without eliding or excluding the
personal or social value they may have.
Ferguson’s “Mobile Subjectivities” (as a reconceptualizing metaphor for “self”)
highlight a topography without concretizing a terrain. This seemingly fluidic solid
presents metaphor in its most base and potent form. This conception of the mobile
subjectivities (metaphor) enables it to shift from representation to representation and
connection to connection without becoming mired in discursive power dynamics; the
ability to do this lies within its conceptual and active formulation. By delving into this
amorphous construction, it becomes possible to “see” how Ferguson’s metaphor maps,
without graphing in permanence, a terrain that is generally outside of legibility and
intelligibility (as defined by social
normativity).
Ferguson begins by problematizing the
different ways through and in which we
conceptualize, understand, and value the
solidity of the boundaries between the
personal, social, and/or political,
interconnectedness and separation, the local
and the global, and the singular and the
multiple. It has been taught that these are each separate, definable, and discrete concepts.
For example, the personal, the social, and the political are conceptualized as separate
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because of the perceived “realms” they occupy with personal in opposition to
social/political. Figure 7: Oppositional Constructs (above) highlights the discrete
compartmentalization of the dynamics Ferguson problematizes. She posits that to
continue this line of understanding excludes the experiential components each has. This
seeming mutual exclusivity is based on the conception and value placed on discretion,
compartmentalization, and opposition. To counter point this “natural” tendency, Ferguson
purposely positions “Mobile Subjectivities” between, through, and in tandem with these
dualistic constructions.
The positing of “Mobile Subjectivities” in flux, affords this metaphor the option
of “strategic positionality”. (Ferguson, 1993) This occurs through the metaphorical action
of language, specifically, both terms in her metaphor are fluid in conception. Mobile, in
this case, holds the themes of movement/action, object, and locus in tandem. While
subjectivities encourages multiplicity and contextualization. This amorphous fluctuating
dynamic allots this metaphor a greater range of interaction and connection. To clarify,
back in Figure 1: Y=1/X (pg 3), I show curves as well as points along or within them.
This visualization shows curves, segments of these, and points. The mutative and
connective dynamic contained therein is the starting point of the metaphor for Ferguson.
In the definition Ferguson gives for “Mobile Subjectivities”, she illuminates how
the conceptualization and value of constructs need not be solid and fixed. Rather, she
seems to advocate a dynamic and position of semi-permanence. To accomplish this, she
puts forth four contextual and interactive formulations: temporality, relationship, irony,
and ambiguity. Ferguson writes:
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Mobile subjectivities are temporal, moving across and along axes
of power (which are themselves in motion) without fully residing in them.
They are relational, produced through shifting yet enduring encounters and
connection, never fully captured by them. They are ambiguous: messy and
multiple, unstable but persevering. They are ironic, attentive to the
manyness of things. They respect the local, tend toward the specific, but
without eliminating the cosmopolitan. They are politically difficult in their
refusal to stick consistently to one stable identify claim; yet they are
politically advantageous because they are less pressed to police their
boundaries, more able to negotiate respectfully with contentious others.
(Ferguson, 1993)
This positing “locates” mobile subjectivities between, across, and within the
dualities for it relies on context, content, and intent. This allows Ferguson’s metaphor to
be a fluidic solid with multiple singularities. What this means is that the “Mobile
Subjectivities” metaphor occupies a range of locations and interacts with many dynamics
simultaneously. In Figure 8: Mobile
Subjectivities (right), Ferguson’s metaphor is
both curve and asymptote. Mobile
subjectivities can enter legibility and
intelligibility (curve and points) but does not
require these (asymptote) to continue to act.
This functionality of Ferguson’s “Mobile
Subjectivities” allows her metaphor to remain
metaphorical (fluid, dynamic, unstable)
without giving up form and action. Specifically, “Mobile Subjectivities” exists in both
interstitial and emergent spaces allowing it to enter into or be part of the curves, escape
from and contest these same positions (asymptotes), and work to bridge/connect the
curves (bridging the curves and/or eliding the asymptotes).
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Through this chapter, I have highlighted the interactive “nature” of metaphor in
connection with theoretical concepts. Metaphor is oft times seen as a replacement for or
elision of some thing/concept/dynamic. Instead, metaphors offer a different presentation,
view, or formulation to aid in comprehension. Perfromance theory utilizes metaphor as a
way to contextualize the shifting and interactive domain of the social world. Haraway’s
“Cyborg” posits metaphor as a nexus or center, where multiple (often contentious)
conceptualizations and formulations can meet in a relational paradigm. And, Ferguson’s
“Mobile Subjectivities” encourages the amorphous and mutable essence of metaphors,
while acknowledging the need for solidity and fixity within specific locations, dynamics,
and systems. Through, these I have attempted to show how my asymptote works, not
only to map argumentation, but as a metaphor capable of many things, yet not explicitly
tied to any. This formulation of the asymptote metaphor highlights the functionality of
metaphors in general; and, at the same time, encourages their continued use for
theoretical and conceptual purposes. And, through this chapter, I have implicitly
illuminated another function of my asymptotes metaphor: metaphor as explanation or for
explanatory purposes. However, the asymptotes metaphor can also be utilized as a
pedagogical tool.
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Metaphor as Pedagogical Tool

“I’ve read this three times and I just don’t get it.” This is a statement I have heard
innumerable times. And, I think: how am I going to guide this student to or aid him/her in
finding an answer(s)? In many cases, I find that the transition from the concepts written
in articles, books, etc. to the understanding or incorporating of this information into the
mind is not always an easy one. Further, it is oft times not a question of comprehension
or ability, rather one of connection and bridging. So, finding the signposts and/or map(s)
of the conceptual/theoretical framework or argument is essential. Now, this is rarely a
singular or simple task. Instead, multiple attempts are more common. Further, there tends
to be metaphor(s) or sets of metaphorical connections that work as both signpost and
map. I continually notice that the metaphors that work best (for me) are those that include
and utilize conceptual, visual, and performative dynamics.
Jyl Lynn Feldman argues, “good pedagogy, is up close and personal, rather than
intimidating and detached” and that “the boundaries between personal space and national
state must be collapsed.” (2001) In Never a dull moment: Teaching and the Art of
Performance-Feminism Takes Center Stage, she posits a performative pedagogy,
formulated of visual, visceral, and interactive components. Performative pedagogy is
utilized and presented as both tool and style. It consists of an “equilateral triangle… of
three parts: spectacle, spectator, and spectacular.” (2001) She argues that we need to
reconceptualize the students as “spectators” and the professor as performer/ producer of
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“spectacle” (2001). Then everything, from ‘normal’ discussions to explosions,
disruptions, and/or departures “becomes… a spectacular, pedagogical fireworks displayan event to watch, appreciate, applaud in all its colorful, insightful splendor.” (2001) She
is arguing that it is not enough to change the way we teach—i.e. find a new approach—
rather, we need to change the way we think about teaching and what it means to teach.
bell hooks extends this reconceptualization of the educational paradigm through
her argument for an “engaged pedagogy” (1994). In Teaching to Transgress: Education
as the Practice of Freedom, she posits “engaged pedagogy” as means to re-integrate and
encourage critical thinking, responsibility, and participation in the classroom and
pedagogical paradigm. hooks argues that the old educational paradigm build of/on the
separation of mind and body, the disconnection of theory and practice, and the absence of
Eros26 is no longer working. “Ideally, education should be a place where the need for
diverse teaching methods and styles would be valued, encouraged, [and] seen as essential
to learning.” (hooks, 1994) To break away from the old normative process, hooks points
out that “without the capacity to think critically about our selves and our lives, none of us
would be able to move forward, to change, to grow.” (1994) Further, there should be a
celebration, a sharing, a passionate exchange of ideas. Moreover, as we share this passion
of ideas, learning, and engagement, students begin to respond and this response (positive
and/or negative) draws the students in—they begin to participate. Through this
participation, students begin to feel, and maybe even see themselves as part of a learning
community. And, as their attachments to and confidence in the learning community
grows, they begin to find a sense of mutual responsibility for its growth and development.
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Eros—passion and love—a force that provides an epistemological ground informing how we know what
we know and invigorating class discussion and exciting the critical imagination (hooks, 1993).
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By extension, as the students become more engaged and involved, the classroom
becomes a “field of possibility.” (hooks 1994) Like Feldman, hooks notes that any
pedagogical approach should engage and encourage the students whether we view
education in terms of theatrical interaction and display or a passionate engagement of
critical thinking. Both hooks and Feldman, agree that all pedagogical approaches need a
multiplicity of tools so that the classroom dynamic does not stagnate. Within this context,
I put forth the asymptotes metaphor as a new pedagogical tool for its potential to
encourage critical thinking, participation, and discussion. To explain, detail, and highlight
the asymptotes metaphor as pedagogical tool, I will focus on three commonly difficult
concepts for students in Women’s Studies and Feminist Theory classrooms: gender,
semiotics, and abject. This is by no means an exhaustive list of my own utilization of the
asymptotes metaphor. I have, also, used it to teach and engage concepts as varied as race/
ethnicity, class, elite/ subaltern, self/ other, and so on. Here, I focus on Gender, semiotics
and abject for their illustrative and explanatory value.
When I first began teaching and attempted to explain that gender is a social
construct or set of socially normative understandings, I would look out at a classroom of
blank faces. I tried lists on paper, on the board. I tried discussion. I even tried free-flow
brainstorming. These did not seem to be working, because as the semester(s) progressed
gender would need to be explained again and again. However, the first time I tried the
asymptotes metaphor it worked, meaning no more semester-long reiterations of what
gender is and what it is not. What follows is a discussion on how the asymptotes
metaphor works as a pedagogical tool for explaining gender.
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I generally begin with a series of seemingly simple questions. What is your sex?
What is your gender? How do you know? This last question is where the greatest amount
of discussion and the crux of the pedagogical action occurs. After several minutes of
scrambling around the board, while either students or myself try to get all the responses
up, I ask if everything on the board relates to one or more than one topic and what is the
topic(s). In most cases, I end up with two lists: sex and gender. At this point, I draw a
figure on the board (see Figure 1: Y=1/X, pg 3). This figure becomes the background for
the discussion to follow, as it does in the classroom.
In its first incarnation, the figure is blank and the general mathematic rules of
asymptotes are defined (see asymptote discussion pg 3-4 and footnotes 1,5,6, and 7).
Now, that these have been set, I can move on
to labels in the figure: specifically, sex and
gender (see Figure 9: Sex, left, and Figure 10:
Gender, below). I have the class subdivide the
lists into categories. For example, sex may
contain biology, genetics, physical or bodily
differences and so on. Once the subtopics have
been formulated, these are also placed in the
figure under the related major topic. The
question now becomes: how distinct or definitive are these topics? And, how do these
topics interrelate? What happens is a shifting into either mathematic or logic based
relations: A + B = C or If A, then B, etc. These figures (Figure 9: Sex and Figure 10:
Gender) are the foundational conceptions and assumptions about gender and sex that are
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problematized and interrogated to encourage the students to re-interpret and engage these
topics.
I focus on sex (Figure 9: Sex) first because this is where many students assume
facts and/or hard and fast answers about sex are or come into “existence”. In Figure 9:
Sex (above), I highlight how there is a general conception of only two options for
“sexing” the body. Female and male are conceptualized as separate and distinct
categories. I, then, have the students return to
the original lists made (prior to the figures) and
find and input the information they see or
comprehend as belonging to the male sex and
female sex. Following this, I begin to question
and problematize the distinctions that have
been made. For example, what about xx-males
or xy-females? Or what about the children born
inter-sexed27? After problematizing these
distinctions, the students begin to see that information they believed to be concretely
contained within the curves, actually bleeds over into a middle space between them.
What this does is destabilize the grounding concreteness that “sex” is assumed to be,
because if a range of hormones, chromosomes, and bodies are available, then how can
sex by divided into only two groups. In the beginning of the discussion of sex, the
asymptotes (x- and y- axes) are conceptualized by students as the frames and boundaries
27

I generally give a brief overview of the distinctions between intersexed and hermaphrodite. This
discussion however is outside the scope of this work. For the full discussion of this topic see Anne FaustoSterling’s— Sexing the Body: Gender Politics and the Construction of Sexuality. New York: Basic Books,
2000.
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over which sex cannot cross. However, by the end, these same asymptotes, actually
illuminate the range of sex combinations (genitals, chromosomes, hormones, etc)
possible. From this figure (Figure 9: Sex), I move to the gender figure, which is a
reiteration of Figure 9: Sex but with gender as the focus. And, I begin the process again.
However, because the stage has been set for a new conceptualization, I have the students
either come up to the board or get in groups and have them fill in the figure.
In this new figure, Male and Female or Masculinity and Femininity are in the
same locations as those present in the sex figure (Figure 9, above). The general types of
information that the students come up with in regards to gender are located in the upper
right and lower left respectively. The distinction here however is that the students are
thinking of the asymptotes and categories in more than one way simultaneously. They
look to find these “things” that make female and male distinct, but they also look for any
that can cross over and bridge the space
between. The twist for the student comes in
when they begin to realize and conceptualize
gender, and then sex, as being built of societal
and/or social frames of reference and rules. So
that when I combine to the figures (revised as
Figure 11: Sex and Gender, left), the
distinctions and connections between the
categories of sex and gender actually work to
re-conceptualize them as mutually exclusive and interconnected at the same time, through
the interaction of the curves and asymptotes of the figure. When first asked about their
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sex and gender, many students gave the same answer without consciously understanding
why—meaning that for them sex and gender were the same concept, just a different
word. However, after the separate but related discussions of sex and gender, the students
tend to see these as separate. The final question I ask is what allows this seemingly
incongruent conception of sex and gender as both connected or same and separate or
distinct? The response generally is society or social norms. Thus, in the end, the students
realize that the curves function to show different frames of reference for sex and/or
gender, while the asymptotes are the overall societal framework that designate the
conceptualization of each—i.e. gender and sex are constructed through society. This
conceptualization of asymptotes is rather straightforward due to the tangible or physical
nature of sex and gender, however the asymptotes metaphor also works for less tangible,
more conceptual topics like semiotics.
Semiotics, the general philosophical theory and study of signs and symbols within
artificial and “natural” languages, is approached differently depending on whether it is
part of discussion in an introductory course in Women’s Studies or engagement and
argumentation in a more specialized feminist theory course. However, in both situations,
a general overview occurs and this is what I will focus on. While teaching, semiotics
generally comes to the fore once the first sets of (academically focused) writing
assignments have been turned in. In many cases, the subsequent class is, at least partially,
devoted to the importance of language and linguistic choice. I draw a “rectangle” on the
board (longer sides vertical, shorter side horizontal). “What have I just drawn?” “A
rectangle.” Then, I draw a stick figure at the upper central portion. “What is this?” I
receive several answers: “It’s a door, it’s a bathroom, a door to the men’s restroom”, and
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so on. Following, I ask, “How do you know?” After, being bombarded with answers, I
have them contemplate how the connection between this symbol/sign and the physical
location or space is made. To clarify my point, I draw and shade in a triangle over the
stick figure with the apex at the conjunction of the torso and arms and base just past the
conjunction of the legs. “Is this the same figure?”, “No, it’s the ladies’, women’s
bathroom.” Generally, the students are scratching their heads and I write a simple
equation on the board: symbol one (stick figure) = men’s bathroom. “Is this a valid
representation of how we think of this symbol?” Returning to the drawing, I erase the
figure and write in “Bathroom” and ask if the meaning has changed and how.
Now that the frame is set, I can finally begin the discussion of semiotics. What
occurs is a positioning of the problem as assumed meaning(s) from words or symbols. To
explain this, I change the equation or relationship of the symbol and meaning and the
word and concept, with the symbol/word over a line and the meaning/concept
underneath. It is assumed or accepted that there is a concrete connection between the
words/symbols we use or see, without thinking about the impact this might have on
comprehension and meaning. These assumptions become very important in speaking and
writing because we can end up with unintended meanings and concepts being included.
Moreover, the arbitrariness of these assumed concrete connections is eclipsed. For
example, the term “gay” has had multiple meaning and many different levels of “value”.
Instead of compiling a list per se, I draw a figure on the board (see Figure 12: Gay,
below). In this figure, I add the term gay inside one curve and a few meanings in the
other. Oft times, it is assumed that a term can just be used and others will “know” what is
meant. However, think about the different ways that metaphors, double entendres,
41

oxymorons, etc. are used. In these cases, multiple meanings are intended. But, this same
doubling or multiplying of meaning can and
does occur with other words. Returning to the
figure, gay can be utilized in speech and
writing in a number of different ways and this
choice, no matter how much we disagree, is
always arbitrary. For example, looking at the
lines in the center of Figure 12: Gay (right),
which individual or group of meaning(s) can
or could be used? To clarify, imagine a group
of friends is sitting together and one of them says, “I’m gay”. Emotive and psychological
reactions aside, what is this individual saying? Looking at the figure, there are several
different meanings to choose from and we must assume and infer which one the
individual has chosen. For example, the line in the upper left (see Figure 12: Gay, above),
could be seen as representative of the former statement. To look at it in a different light,
what if the statement was “that’s gay”? Here, again, an inference and connection occurs.
But, when speaking, there are many other bits and types of information to aid us in
making the “appropriate” connections. In writing, all we have are the words on the page
and their relationship(s) to each other. What becomes important is the realization that a
term cannot ever completely capture the object or concept it attempts to name.28 Another
figure is used to illustrate this point (see Figure 13: Signs, below).

28

Within Philosophy, this dynamic has an extremely long history. However, an overview or review of this
is not available due to space constraints. Some excellent starting sources are Elizabeth Grosz’ Jacques
Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (London: Routledge, 1990) and Ferdinand de Saussure “Course in General
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This figure gives a representation to
the interactions between names/terms and
objects/concepts. The names/terms or
signifiers are contained in one curve and the
objects/concepts or signifieds are contained in
another.29 For comprehension, the signifier
curve contains the word restroom and the
signified curve a couple of different
definitions. The asymptotes (x- and y- axes)
and the space between the curves represents
the gulf of legibility and intelligibility, the space of arbitrary choice. What this figure
exemplifies is the inability of signifiers (the bathroom) to ever, in any exactness,
concretely/permanently connect to signifieds (conception of bathroom) because the
name/term is never the same thing as the object/concept to which it refers. And, because
there is not an exacting relationship between these, language and linguistic choices are
always open for disruption and misinterpretation. Semiotics, or the study of signs,
reminds us that language is relational, metaphorical, and conceptually conscientious.
Specifically, this metaphorical relation is precisely the dynamic that Figures 12 and 13
highlight via the asymptotes.

Linguistics” in Critical Theory Since 1965, edited by Hazard Adams and Leroy Searle (Tallahassee: Florida
State University Press, 1986).
29
My understanding and conceptualization of signs and semiotics comes from Elizabeth Grosz Jacques
Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (Condon: Routledge, 1990) and class discussion in Dr. Carolyn DiPalma’s
Advanced Feminist Theory course at the University of South Florida
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Additionally, the asymptotes’ metaphor also works to map the space of arbitrary
choice or gulf in legibility and intelligibility by working as explanation and
conceptualization of abjects or process of abjection. Teaching and discussing the concept
of abject(s) and the process of abjection is a study in the act of reference. As abject and
abjection are quite conceptually difficult to understand, it is often necessary to reference
previous class and (as is the case here) written discussions. Further, it is easier to look at
abject and abjection as separate topics/concepts and then pull them together than to try
and explain them in tandem. As often happens, the concept of abjects comes to the fore
when students either hear or read the term and the hunt for frames of reference begins.
To discuss abjection, I always try to return to a moment in class or a passage in
the readings that the students have either read or at least remember. Oft times, this is the
sex/gender discussions, where questions of the “knowing” of sex/gender are still
problematic. I redraw the figures for sex and gender (see Figure 9: Sex and Figure 10:
Gender). After doing this, it becomes important to have the students reiterate the previous
framing of these figures, give or have them define some specific terms, and have the
dynamics and terms re-conceptualized to verify understanding. Two terms of importance
here are legible and intelligible. And, to aid in understanding, I ask the students to label
and/or note each term and dynamic in the figure, and to identify what is the overall frame
of reference or lens of conceptualization. For Figure 9: Sex (pg.37), the overall frame is
science or medical discourse with each term (inside or outside the curves) being legible
and intelligible; while for Figure 10: Gender (pg.38), the frame is social normativity with
all the terms again being legible and intelligible. To begin the process of understanding
abjection, I have the students relabel the frame for sex as social space, and ask “If the
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frame has changed from science or medical discourse to social space, are all the same
terms or topics still readable and knowable? And, if not, which one(s) have changed and
why?” Several reactions and events generally occur. One, chromosomes and hormones
become illegible because in “social space” they cannot be seen. Two, a debate ensues as
to whether or not genitals should be listed as illegible and/or unintelligible or if they
should be included in secondary sex characteristics as they are referential points for
complementary genitals. Three, the division or distinction between sex and gender starts
to collapse or is, at least, up for serious debate again. And, finally the concept of sex in
and of itself comes under fire because it seems to be disappearing. After a few minutes of
discussion, debate, and anxiety, I redraw the sex and gender figure (See Figure 11: Sex &
Gender, pg.39) and ask the students to remember the discussion where we talked about
gender and sex as both being socially
constructed. I do this to reiterate the problem
with seeing sex or gender as fixed. Further,
that the frame of reference or lens of
conceptualization that we choose affects what
is available to be seen and known. To further
explain, I draw a new figure on the board. I
start with the standard curves and lines that
have been used previously, inside each curve I
put the terms parents and parenthood, with the edges of the curves and the asymptotes
designating the limit(s) of who are parent, what parenthood entails, and so on, with non/unfit parents outside the curves. I ask, “How these are learned or understood comes from
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where?”, with general responses being “parents/experience, community, culture, society,
religion, etc.” With these in mind, I ask, “Where would homosexual parents fit into this
figure?”, knowing, of course, that this will cause discussion and debate. After a few
seconds, I ask them to calm down and see if they can understand what I am adding to the
figure.
The new/revised figure (Figure 14: Abjection, right) has 2 new curves added and
on the horizontal line (x-axis or asymptote) I have written ‘homosexual parents’30. In the
brief discussion and debate that ensues there are many sides, however there are two
general camps and each of these will have an impact on how the figure is conceptualized
and understood. As a general view, in the left side of the figure the curve moves up to
include homosexual parents, while the right side curve moves away from homosexual
parents. This distinction is where the idea of homosexual parents can be seen as being
included and excluded. Now, I turn attention to the terms put forth earlier. I ask, “has the
term or concept of homosexual parents always been around or in use?” with the answer
generally being “no.” “Then in that case, here was a time when the idea and concept of
homosexual parents along with the term did not exist?” “Yes.” “So, returning to the
figure, the right side could represent a time when “homosexual parents” was outside of
knowing and the left side could represent present time when “homosexual parents” as
term and concept are known.” Specifically, then, the discussion and debate was centered
around whether or not “homosexual parents” should be included or excluded in/from
parents and parenthood, meaning one side encourages “homosexual parents” continuing

30

I have placed ‘homosexual parents’ on the horizontal line because of the argumentation of previously
abject, currently legible and intelligible gay and/or lesbian parent. This will be more fully explained as I
move through the rest of the discussion.
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to be legible and intelligible while the other encourages or pushes for illegibility and
unintelligibility.
Abjection, then, is the conscious or unconscious desire/intent to remove or push a
concept, term, idea, etc. from being known and understood. This does not mean that the
concept, idea, or in this case persons do not exist, rather that there would be no way to
conceptualize and comprehend it/them. To
hone this down to what abject, as a term,
means then I return to the blank curves and
lines and inside each curve write the terms
“rapist” and “rape” (see Figure 15: Abject,
below). I ask, “What comes to mind when
you see the words?” The most common
response is “men”. “Does this mean that only
men are rapists?” The general responses
range from adamant yes’ to qualified yes’ and no’s to adamant no’s. “Does anyone know
the current legal definition of rape in Florida?” In a few cases, I may have one or two
students know; however, more often, the students don’t know the current legal definition.
The current legal definition is “Sexual battery is the oral, anal, or vaginal penetration by,
or union with, the sexual organ or another or the anal or vaginal penetration of another by
any other object.”31 What this means then, in relation to this figure, is that anyone over
the age of consent (which in Florida is sixteen) can be charged with “rape”. However,

31

Florida Statutes: Title XLVI (Crimes) Ch. 775-896. Chapter 794 (Sexual Battery).
http://www.flsenate.gov/Statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&URL=Ch0794/titl0794.htm
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this is only the case because the law changed thrity-plus years ago32, prior to that only
men could be charged with and only if it involved sexual penetration by the man on a
woman against her will or a child because they could not consent. Therefore, under the
old law, women could not be charged with “rape” per se, because of the way it was
worded. Only men could be rapists because women were abject under the law—there was
no way to conceptualize women as perpetrators of rape. However, women have entered
intelligibility and legibility under the current law. So, in the figure (Figure 15: Abject,
above), under the old law, women would be outside the curves, outside the legal
definition of rape. The edge of the curves and the x- and y- axes (asymptotes) then are the
transition point between what is abject and what is legible and intelligible under that law.
Therefore, abjects are both those things/ideas/concepts beyond legibility and
intelligibility and those that disappear from the seen and known through the process of
abjection.
Through this section, I have attempted to highlight how the asymptotes metaphor
works as a pedagogical tool. As a pedagogical tool, the asymptotes metaphor incorporates
many of the points that Feldman and hooks posit as essential to pedagogy—namely
interaction, engagement, and critical thinking. I present the asymptotes metaphor, not as a
replacement for other pedagogical tools, rather as a new tool that both highlights the
variability and functionality of visual and perceptual metaphors as pedagogical tools and
how this specific metaphor can be utilized to reconceptualize, engage, and teach.

32

The official date change to the current statute was October 1, 1972. Florida Law 72-724, sect. 7.
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Metaphors and Asymptotes

In this thesis, I put forth the mathematical trope of asymptotes as both metaphor
and pedagogical tool. In reconceptualizing asymptotes out of their mathematical frame
and into theoretical argumentation, I opened them to decidedly different implicit and
explicit uses than those contained within mathematical disciplines. The basic implicit use
I wished to put forward was to encourage and illustrate the value and importance of
interdisciplinary dialogue and utilization. My explicit use(s) of asymptotes was as
metaphor and pedagogical tool. To do this, I implemented asymptotes as a means to map
and highlight how “the body” enters into and exist as both epistemological and
ontological construct. I did this through the paralleling of asymptotes and feminist
arguments about how bodies come into “being” and how they are “known”, with specific
focus abject bodies, (en)framed bodies, and telos bodies/ teleological conceptions of the
body.
To recast this formulation of asymptotes as metaphor, I illuminated how
metaphors, my own included, make theoretical positing and argumentation possible
through their use as signposts and maps for comprehending and situating theoretical
discourse. I focused on how metaphor aids in theoretical argumentation as well as the
ways that metaphor aids in the following (conceptualizing) and comprehending
(mapping) of this argumentation. I chose three well-known theorist-scholars from within
the feminist canon: Judith Butler, Donna Haraway, and Kathy Ferguson. I utilized
49

metaphor and asymptotes to aid in outlining Butler’s “performance” as a theoretical
metaphor and as a means to map and understand her positing and argumentation.
Haraway’s “cyborg” was illuminated as conceptualization of metaphor as nexus or center
point for the cross-conceptualization and interconnection of multiple dynamics and
systems. In highlighting Ferguson’s “mobile subjectivities”, metaphor was positioned as
a fluidic, situationally solid construct for the purposes of comprehension and utility
within varying systems of discourse and action. From this space of metaphor as tool, I
shifted to pedagogical space to illustrate metaphor’s value in educational dynamics.
Metaphor as pedagogical tool is not new; rather, I have put forward my
asymptotes metaphor as a new tool for the conceptualization of theoretical ideas as well
as a means for the comprehension and utilization of conceptually difficult constructs and
relations. Specifically, I highlighted how metaphor, particularly my own, worked to
outline, explain, and resituate critical thought, engagement, and participation by
encouraging and aiding students in the educational process. My hope was to show that
the asymptotes metaphor could be utilized as a means to teach both concrete and
amorphous theoretical concepts. To this end, I outlined how I have used the asymptotes
metaphor to teach topics as varied as sex and gender to semiotics to the concept of
abjects. My wish is that my asymptotes metaphor, along with other visual and perceptual
metaphors, may be seen as viable pedagogical tool to revitalize and engage both
educators and students.
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